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Oil price movements and




There has been considerable speculation over the years concerning
the cost of large oil price movements (“shocks”) to consuming coun-
tries. For the advanced industrial countries, the conventional wis-
dom appears to be that, because these economies are becoming more
service-oriented, less energy is needed per unit of gross domestic
product (GDP) and hence a lessening of the economic costs associ-
ated with increased oil prices. On the other hand, because many
newly industrialised or catching-up countries are entering a phase
of energy-intensive industrialisation, the same oil shocks are plac-
ing an increasing burden on these economies. One can easily argue,
however, that industrialisation is only one facet of economic change
taking place in the world economy. Conceivably, the rapid pace of
increased globalisation may significantly modify these patterns. To
test this proposition, an operational definition of globalisation is
developed and shown to be positively associated with the strength of
oil price shocks. The main finding of the study is that increased
globalisation appears to be strengthening the impact of oil price
shocks in the advanced industrial countries, but to a much lesser
extent in the newly industrialising countries.
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VER THE YEARS, one of the more illusive questions posed to econo-
mists is the extent to which globalisation is taking place and the impli-
cations these developments may have for the manner in which external
shocks affect domestic economies. With regard to oil price shocks, it is often
argued that, with increased globalisation, the advanced industrial countries are
less susceptible to such shocks. That is, a given percentage increase in the
price of oil today would result in less economic loss over time, due to the fact
that, with globalisation, the structures of these economies are becoming more
information-based and less energy-intensive. Similarly, newly industrialising
countries, that are beginning their phase of energy-intensive, heavy industri-
alisation, might be expected to be more subject to economic losses associated
with the increased price of energy.
The purpose of this paper is to examine these propositions by first developing an
operational definition of globalisation. Trends in globalisation over the period
1985–96 are then identified for a sample of advanced and newly industrialising coun-
tries. Finally, using vector autocorrelation models of these economies, the impact of oil
price shocks is examined, to assess whether there is any association between increased
globalisation and the severity of oil price shocks.
In short, has globalisation over time strengthened or weakened the oil link? What
elements of globalisation have been most important in this regard? Are these trends
likely to continue into the foreseeable future?
1. The process of globalisation
The current debates over the relative merits of globalisation provide some insight
into the manner in which market price modifications, brought about by the process of
globalisation, might affect the manner in which oil price shocks impact on national
economies in different parts of the world. In a recent article, Nobel Prize winner Amartya
Sen (2001), of Cambridge University, provides some basic answers to several of  the
key elements of this debate that have relevance to the problem at hand.
1. Globalisation is not new, nor is it just Westernisation: over thousands
of years, globalisation has progressed through travel, trade, migra-
tion, the spread of cultural influences and the dissemination of knowl-
edge and understanding (including science and technology).
2. Globalisation is not in itself a folly — it has enriched the world scien-
tifically and culturally and benefited many people economically, as
well. In this regard, modern technologies, as well as economic inter-
relations, have been influential.
3. The use of the market economy can produce different outcomes.
Specifically, the market economy can generate many different results,
depending on how physical resources are distributed, how human
O
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Table 1
Initial categorization of countries according to
globalisation and growth mechanism
Endogenous Primary Isolated
growth Catching-up producer Malthusian economies
Australia Bangladesh Algeria Afghanistan Armenia
Austria Bulgaria Angola Benin Azerbaijan
Belgium China Bolivia Botswana Belarus
Canada Dominican Rep. Cameroon Burkina Faso Kazakhstan
Denmark Hungary Chile Cambodia Kyrgyzstan
Finland Indonesia Congo Central African Moldova
France Jamaica Costa Rica Republic Turkmenistan
Germany Malaysia Côte d’Ivorie Chad Uzbekistan
Hong Kong Mauritius Ecuador Congo, DR
Ireland Mexico Gambia Eritrea
Israel Mongolia Ghana Ethiopia
Italy Nicaragua Guinea Bissau Gabon
Japan Oman Honduras Guatemala
Korea Philippines Kenya Haiti
Netherlands Poland Kuwait Iraq
New Zealand Portugal Mauritania Jordan
Norway Romania Mozambique Laos
Singapore Spain Nigeria Lesotho
Sweden Sri Lanka Papua New Liberia
Switzerland Thailand      Guinea Mali
Taiwan Tunisia Saudi Arabia Namibia
United Kingdom Turkey Sierra Leone Nepal









Source: Sachs, Jeffrey D. (2000), “Globalization and patterns of economic development”,
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 136, No. 4, p. 583.
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resources are developed, what rules prevail and so on in all these
spheres, and the state and the society have roles, within a country and
in the world.
4. The world has changed since the Bretton Woods Agreement — the
current economic, financial and political architecture of the world (in-
cluding the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other
institutions) was largely set up in the 1940s, following the Bretton
Woods Conference in 1944. The implication is that the current system
does not have institutions that are responsive to many of the changed
economic circumstances, and, as such, many parts of the world are
not well served by the current system.
Sen is suggesting that various parts of the world have evolved somewhat differ-
ently over the last few decades and, as a result, possess economic environments that
respond quite differently to various types of external shock. The main problem in as-
sessing the economic consequences of oil price shocks is, therefore, one of deriving an
operational classification of these environments.
1.1 Country classification scheme
In this regard, Jeffrey Sachs (2000) provides a good starting point for grouping
countries in terms of their interaction with the global economy. Although Sachs’s paper
was written to provide a framework for examining the consequences of globalisation
for the growth potential of various parts of the world, it develops an initial country
classification scheme, which seems appropriate for an assessment of the manner in
which market links, such as oil market price movements, produce a differential impact
on domestic economies. As a first approximation to the world’s different economic
environments, Sachs develops five main groups (table 1).
1.1.1 Endogenous growth
These countries are experiencing the process of self-sustaining increases in in-
come generated mainly by technological innovation. Innovation raises national income,
which, in turn, stimulates further innovation in a positive feedback process (Lucas,
1988; Romer, 1986, 1990).
For this group of countries, globalisation should be a major spur to innovation by
increasing the extent of the market. It may also concentrate innovative activity, if it creates
a more integrated global labour market for scientists and engineers, who are then likely to
aggregate in the highly innovative core economies. Most proxies of innovative activity
(patents, research and development expenditure and numbers of scientific publications)
suggest a huge spurt in such activities in the 1990s. The rapid growth of labour productiv-
ity in the United States of America, since the early 1990s, also supports the notion of a
surge in innovation, in line with the increasing globalisation of the world economy.
On the other hand, it is not obvious that globalisation is reducing or increasing this
group’s vulnerability to oil price shocks. The standard answer is that information-based
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economies use less oil per unit of GDP and, therefore, are becoming less dependent on
imported energy. For example, in the case of the USA (Stelzer, 2000) during the 1970s,
oil products accounted for almost nine per cent of GDP. Today the figure is about three
per cent. More efficient car engines are one explanation. Another is the steady shift of
the US economy to knowledge-driven activities.
Presumably, also the endogenous growth countries’ flexibility and abilities to
shift to alternative sources of energy in the short run aid in minimising the economic
impact produced by oil price shocks. However, a good case could be made that in-
creased globalisation has created a greatly expanded set of macroeconomic linkages
between these and many non-endogenous group countries which may be becoming
more vulnerable to oil price shocks, as they speed up industrialisation. An oil shock
induced recession in these countries could feed back to the endogenous countries, seri-
ously affecting their economies through declining export sales. Ultimately then, the net
impact of oil price movements on the endogenous countries can only be assessed through
empirical testing.
1.1.2 Catching-up growth
This group of countries relates to the process whereby an economy, with a lower
level of technology and income (the “follower”), narrows the income gap with the
higher technology and richer countries (the “leader”) through a process of technologi-
cal diffusion and capital flows from leader to follower.
While all countries enjoy some benefit of technological growth in the leading
country, the rate at which technology diffuses from leader to follower differs sharply
around the world. A region that is geographically isolated, for example, is much less
likely to benefit from technological diffusion.
Two kinds of country appear to be winners in the race to absorb technologies
from abroad. Countries with successful export-promotion policies, such as Korea and
Taiwan, have earned the foreign exchange necessary to import technologies from abroad.
Also, countries that have been able to attract large flows of foreign direct investment
have similarly been able to upgrade technologies, with particular success.
There is little doubt that successful catching-up growth involves a positive feed-
back process between technological diffusion and human capital accumulation. Initially,
human capital is low in the laggard economy and technologies are rudimentary. The
country may achieve some modest inflow of technology by attracting labour-intensive,
export-oriented foreign direct investment, for example, labour-intensive assembly op-
erations in export-processing zones. These simple assembly operations generate income,
some modest skills and the resources to invest in improved education. The combination
of rising skill levels and growing educational attainment leads to an upgrading of the
foreign investment facilities.
As with the endogenous countries, it is impossible to say a priori much about the
manner in which increased globalisation is affecting the net effects on these countries
produced by an oil shock. On the one hand, increased globalisation has accelerated
the long-term growth path of these countries (table 2), suggesting that they may be
operating at close to full potential and thus are more vulnerable to oil price increases.
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On the other hand, with increased diversification, these economies may be able to shift
to alternative sources of energy, thus avoiding the full brunt of the external shocks.
Finally, as in the case of the endogenous growth countries, oil price shocks may impact
indirectly through slowing down the growth of major external markets. Again, the
matter must ultimately be resolved through empirical testing and simulation.
1.1.3 Resource-based growth
This is the process whereby an economy experiences cycles of per capita income,
mainly as a result of resource booms and busts. In fact, it has often been noted in recent
years that natural resource-rich economies have faired particularly badly (table 2), es-
pecially in comparison with many of the resource-scarce economies. Even oil booms
may have an adverse effect on oil-producing countries (Looney, 1990) through the
Dutch disease mechanisms — an overvalued exchange rate, increased domestic infla-
tion and a shift to non-trade activities. However, given the Dutch disease effect is a
longer-term phenomenon, it is probably safe to conclude that, at least in the case of oil
producers, the short-run effect of an oil price increase would be positive. Given their
rigidity and lack of diversification, non-oil-producing countries would most likely have
Table 2
Characteristics of countries, according to growth/globalization categories
Endogenous Catching-up Primary
growth  growth commodity Malthusian Isolated
countries countries producers countries economies
Number of countries 23 23 32 31 8
Population 844 2,063 465 466 74
total for group, millions
GNP per capita 20,400 5,599 3,694 1,782 2,372
US $ basis
Annual growth of 2.1 2.7 0 –0.3 na
GNP per capita, 1990–99
Population in temporate 76 28 9 4 14
ecozones, %
Population within 100 km 69 59 44 19 0
 of the sea, %
Source: Sachs, Jeffrey D., “Globalization and patterns of economic development”,
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol 136, No. 4, 2000, p. 584.
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declines in their incomes during periods of oil price shocks, especially with globalisation
increasing their dependence on foreign markets.
1.1.4 Malthusian decline
Malthusian decline is a process of falling per capita income caused by popula-
tion pressures outstripping the carrying capacity of the local economy, in circum-
stances in which the country is neither innovating nor successfully adopting tech-
nologies from abroad. These countries seem to be experiencing a long-term decline
in living standards, that transcends the effects of terms-of-trade shocks of cyclical
phenomena. Sub-Saharan Africa is the most disturbing case of an impoverished re-
gion suffering outright declines in living standards. Somewhat less dramatically, the
Andean region seems also to be stuck with stagnant or even falling living standards.
Given the economic structure of this group of countries, it is probably safe to as-
sume that any trends in globalisation would increase their vulnerability to oil price
shocks.
1.1.5 Economic isolation
Economic isolation is a phenomenon of economic stagnation that results from an
economy’s physical or policy-induced isolation from world markets. The main prob-
lem with the landlocked countries is that international trade is sharply hindered by the
geographical isolation of these countries. In terms of increased globalisation, foreign
investors, in particular, do not view these impoverished nations as effective platforms
for export-oriented foreign direct investment. Thus these countries are typically un-
able to attract the kind of assembly operations in garments, electronics, footwear and
other sectors, which have been important stepping stones to economic development in
more favourably located economies. Foreign investors come, if at all, only to exploit
primary commodities with a high value per unit weight — such as oil and gas, dia-
monds and other metals — since such commodities can be profitably exploited, even
when transport costs are high. Without the diversification and flexibility needed to
modify oil price shocks, one must conclude that these countries, unless hydrocarbon
producers themselves, are very vulnerable to developments in the international oil
market.
1.1.6 Summary
The previous sections have outlined a very general starting point for examining
how trends in trends in globalisation may affect the manner in which oil price increases
impact upon economies. Clearly, the great diversity of economic environments makes
generalisation in this area very hazardous. On the other hand, several distinctive na-
tional economic environments can be identified. As a very first approximation, it is
reasonable to expect that most, or all, countries in a particular group would be affected
in a roughly similar manner by external oil shocks.
Building on this framework, the next section provides an operational method for
quantifying these country groupings and, when necessary, reclassifying countries to
better reflect a common underlying set of global economic forces. More importantly,
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the analysis will assess the manner in which globalisation has altered the structure of
these countries over time, with regard to making them more or less vulnerable to oil
price shocks.
1.2. Quantification of globalisation
One of the main hindrances, to a meaningful assessment of the manner in which
increased globalisation affects the manner in which oil price shocks impact on national
economies, is that the term “globalisation” remains vague, meaning different things to
different people and groups. There seems to be a consensus that globalisation — whether
economic, political, cultural or environmental — is defined by increasing levels of
interdependence over vast distances. A study by A.T. Kearney (2001) notes, however,
that few people have undertaken the task of actually trying to measure those levels of
interdependence. For instance, how do we determine the extent to which a country has
become embedded within the global economy? How do we demonstrate that globalisa-
tion is racing ahead, rather than just limping along?  Clearly the lack of a clear, precise
definition underlies much of the current arguments and debates over the extent of
globalisation and the manner that this phenomenon is changing the structure of national
economies. As the Kearney study notes: “Without the means to quantify the extent of
globalisation, any meaningful evolution of its effects will remain elusive” (A.T. Kearny
2001, p. 56).
1.2.1 Previous attempts at quantification
The Kearney approach is to reverse-engineer globalisation and break it down
into its most component parts. On a country-by country basis, Kearney quantifies the
levels of personal contact across national boarders by combining data on international
travel, international phone calls and cross-border remittances and other transfers. The
Kearney index charts the World Wide Web by assessing, not only its growing numbers
of users, but also the number of internet hosts and secure servers through which they
communicate, find information and conduct business transactions.
The Kearney globalisation index also measures economic integration, tracks the
movements of goods and services by examining the changing share of international
trade in each country’s economy, and measures the permeability of national borders
through the convergence of domestic and international prices. The index also tracks the
movements of money by tabulating inward and outward direct foreign investment and
portfolio capital flows, as well as income payments and receipts.
As the Kearney study notes, much of the conventional wisdom, cherished by both
champions and critics of globalisation, collapses under the weight of hard data, ranging
from the pace and scale of global integration and the characteristics of the digital di-
vide to the impact of globalisation on income inequality, democratisation and corrup-
tion. Rosenau (1996) has also outlined the many of the benefits in, and conceptual
problems of, devising a meaningful operational definition of globalisation.
While the Kearney index is a step in the right direction, it still suffers from many
of the problems associated with index construction. Here the problems are fundamen-
tally as follows.
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(1) What measures do you want to include in the index?
(2) Are these measures comparable across countries? Specifically, is there
a universal standard on what each measure comprises, and is the data
of equal quality across countries?
(3) What system of weights will be used to combine the various measures
into a final summary index? Clearly, each possible (arbitrary) weight-
ing system will provide a somewhat different picture as to the extent
of globalisation in any particular country. The Kearney study does not
treat these issues, but they need to be addressed before the index can
provide any new meaningful insights into the globalisation process.
Lockwood (2001) outlines a number of other problems associated
with Kearney index.
1.2.2 A new approach to quantification
One way to get around this problem is to compile an extensive data set of the most
widely used economic statistics and measures of world trade, capital flows, economic inte-
gration and the like. Clearly, many of these measures will overlap and thus be redundant.
Using factor analysis, however, the main dimensions of global diversity can be identified.
More specifically, the basic assumption of factor analysis is that a limited number
of underlying dimensions (factors) can be used to explain complex phenomena. The
resulting data reduction produces a limited number of independent (uncorrelated) com-
posite measures. In the current example, measures, such as value added per unit of
capital, value added per labourer, value added per firm and so on, could provide a
composite index of productivity or relative efficiency in factor usage. One advantage
of indexes formed in this manner is that it avoids the problem of selecting one measure
of efficiency, say value added per worker, over just as logical alternatives.
Formally, as an initial step in exploratory data analysis, factor analysis has three
objectives: to study the correlations of a large number of variables, by clustering the
variables into factors, such that variables within each factor are highly correlated; to
interpret each factor, according to the variables belonging to it; and to summarise many
variables by a few factors.
The usual factor analysis model expresses each variable as a function of the fac-
tors common to several variables and a factor unique to the variable:
zj = aj1F1 + aj2F2 + ..... + ajmFm + Uj (1)
where:
zj = the jth standardised variable
m = the number of factors common to all the variables
Uj = the factor unique to variable zj
aji = factor loadings
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The number of factors, m, should be small and the contribution of the unique factors
should also be small. The individual factor loadings, aji, for each variable should be either
very large or very small, so each variable is associated with a minimal number of factors.
To the extent that this factor analysis model is appropriate for the problem at
hand, the objectives noted above can be achieved. Variables with high loadings on a
factor tend to be highly correlated with each other, and variables that do not have the
same loading patterns tend to be less highly correlated. Each factor is interpreted ac-
cording to the magnitudes of the loadings associated with it.
Perhaps more importantly for the problem at hand, the original variables can be
replaced by the factors with little loss of information. Each case (firm) receives a score
for each factor; these factor scores can be computed as:
Fi = bi1z1 + bi2z2 + ...bipzp (2)
where bij are the factor score coefficients. Factor scores are, in turn, used in the discri-
minant analysis that follows. In general, these factor scores have less error and are,
therefore, more reliable measures than the original variables. The scores express the
degree to which each case possesses the quality or property that the factor describes.
The factor scores have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
Operationally, the computations of factors and factor scores for each country
were obtained through a principal components procedure.  The data used in the analy-
sis was taken from the annual World Bank World Development Indicators (2001) and
include:
1. Domestic absorption (per cent of GDP)
2. Domestic credit provided by banking sector (per cent of GDP)
3. Expenditure, total (per cent of GDP)
4. Trade (per cent of GDP)
5. Trade (per cent of goods GDP)
6. Imports of goods and services (per cent of GDP)
7. Financing from abroad (per cent of GDP)
8. Foreign direct investment, net inflows (per cent of GDP)
9. Exports of goods and services (per cent of GDP)
10. Domestic financing, total (per cent of GDP)
11. Gross private capital flows (per cent of GDP, PPP)
12. Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people)
13. Gross foreign direct investment (per cent of GDP, PPP)
14. GDP growth (annual per cent)
15. Import growth (annual per cent)
16. Exports of goods and services (annual per cent growth)
17. Sub-Saharan dummy
18. Small country dummy
19. Oil dummy
20. Revised country classification
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1.2.3 Quantified dimensions of globalisation
While the exact composition of factors varied slightly from year to year over the
analysis period (1985–97), the 20 variables generally produced five main trends or
dimensions (factors).
1. Structural openness, depicting the share of national economic inte-
gration into the world economy. Operationally, this comprises the share
of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. The variables com-
prising this factor do not change much over time and the dimension is
usually the first factor to be extracted from the data set.
2. General globalisation, for lack of a better term. This dimension in-
corporates those variables that load on Sachs’s country grouping
dimension (table 1). Sachs’s list of countries was also expanded to
include several additional countries, such as Brazil. The number of
variables loading on this grouping dimension increase consider-
ably over time, with the factor incorporating an increasingly di-
verse set of global indices. From this, we can conclude that the
process of globalisation affects each of the different country group-
ings in unique ways and that globalisation is an ongoing process, in
this regard.
3. Finance, comprising both domestic and foreign components, such as
foreign direct investment and financing from abroad.
4. Growth/trade expansion, comprising both external and internal meas-
ures of economic expansion. The main variables comprising this fac-
tor are import and export growth and overall GDP growth. Usually
(but not always), GDP growth is highly correlated with the measures
of trade expansion.
5. Global structure, comprising several structural variables to take into
account several unique country characteristics identified in the litera-
ture. The literature (Bloom and Sachs, 1998) suggests that the sub-
African countries may have a unique set of factors that sets them apart
from other developing countries. To take this potential factor into ac-
count, a variable (SUBAF) was created, with zeros for the non-African
countries and one for the African nations.
Another body of literature contends (Looney, 1991) that small countries, due to a
much narrower resource base and smaller domestic market, are at a disadvantage
vis-à-vis their larger counterparts. To take this effect into account, another variable was
created with a value of one assigned to the smaller nations (usually those with a popu-
lation less than five million) and a zero for the larger countries.
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Finally, another body of literature (Looney, 1992) stresses the unique structure of
the oil economies. This factor is taken into account, with a final variable, oil, which
assigns a value of one to the oil economies and a zero to non-oil nations.
1.2.4 Revised factor scores and country groupings
Because Sachs’s classification was intended to examine the growth potential of a
large group of countries, there is a good chance his country groupings do not corre-
spond precisely with an ideal grouping intended to define unique economic environ-
ments for our purposes i.e. the identification of differential impacts stemming from oil
price shocks. Also, Sachs’s definition appears to be static. There is little evidence of
movement between groups or a precise indication of under what circumstances move-
ment might take place.  In the case of economic environments, we would expect more
shifting between groups, as countries evolve and economic policies are altered.
To overcome these limitations, we proceeded (figure 1) with the following
procedure.
First, for each individual year examined, a factor analysis was undertaken using the
20 variables noted above. In the case of 1995, 54 countries had complete data observations
for this period and were retained in the analysis. The 20 variable data set comprised five
main dimensions or factors (based on the constraint of an eigen value of one or greater).
Figure 1
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Sachs’s country classification term was included in the second factor, along with
gross private capital flows, export share of GDP, gross foreign direct investment, etc.
That is, these variables varied significantly by country grouping. The country factor
scores on each dimension are based on a scale, with a mean of zero. Positive numbers
indicate above-normal attainment of a particular factor or global dimension, while nega-
tive values indicate that the country/group is below average in the attainment of that
dimension. For example, in 1995, the trade patterns of the USA account for a consider-
ably smaller share of GDP than the sample norm. The USA is even well below the norm
of the endogenous growth countries (group 1). It is considerably above the sample aver-
age for its attainment of general globalisation (dimension two), but again considerably
below the norm for endogenous growth countries. It is slightly above the norm for global
financial flows, and even above the norm for endogenous growth countries. Finally, the
USA had above-average growth during this period, again somewhat above that of the
group 1 countries. In general, the global structure dimension is an amalgamation of vari-
ables that do not load on one of the main globalisation dimensions, so its significance is
hard to interpret. It is included here to simply show the complete results of the analysis.
Secondly, using the country factor scores from this step, a discriminant analysis
was undertaken to assign a new set of country groupings. Which of the five main
dimensions of globalisation noted above were critical in assigning countries to one of
the five groups? For example, in 1995, two dimensions, (a) general globalisation and
(b) trade expansion, were statistically significant in separating the sample countries
into five main groupings. Of the original country classifications, 71.7 per cent re-
mained in their initial groups, with the remainder assigned to new groups. For exam-
ple, Korea had only a 8.3 per cent chance of being a group 1 (endogenous growth)
country, but a 90.3 per cent chance of correctly falling into group 2 (catching-up).
The third step entailed redefining the country classification variable, from the
results of the second step above. Here, the factor analysis was re-run to generate a new
set of factor scores, more reflective of each country’s position in the total sample and in
its assigned group.
And finally, using these scores, a new discriminate analysis found that general
globalisation (factor 2) and global expansion (factor 3) were statistically significant in
assigning countries to the five-group model. On this basis, the probability of correct
placement in one of the five groups was 92.6 per cent, with all of the group 1 countries
correctly placed. This last step provides the country groupings and factor scores used
in the oil price impact analysis. As noted above, the analysis was undertaken for 1977,
1980, 1983 and each year for the period 1985–97.
1.2.5 Globalisation and the strength of oil shocks
The revised factor scores or globalisation dimensions for each country are a key
element in assessing the manner in which oil price shocks have been modified over
time by changes in the world economy. Using the USA as an example, the link between
oil price shocks and globalisation is outlined in figure 2.
As a starting point, a macroeconomic model was constructed for each of the 19
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endogenous macroeconomic variables, gross capital formation, government consump-
tion and exports (all at constant dollar prices), and three exogenous variables: Japa-
nese constant price GDP, the dollar/special drawing right (SDR) exchange rate and
world oil prices. A first set of simulations for each year (1985–97) were made, using
the historical values for oil prices. A second set of simulations were made, assuming a
ten per cent increase in the price of oil for each base year. The net impact on GDP was
then calculated, by subtracting the simulations incorporating oil price shocks from the
historical series. Oil shock impacts were calculated for the shock year and two subse-
quent years. Finally, the resulting oil shocks were regressed on the various globalisation
dimensions, to assess the role that changes in global dimensions for each country might
have had in modifying the manner in which oil prices altered that country’s GDP.
2. Economic impact of oil price shocks
Using the framework developed above for the changing strength of oil price shocks,
a sample of 19 countries was undertaken.
2.1 USA
2.1.1 Patterns of globalisation
The USA is far and away the world’s leading economic power. Its GDP totalled
US $9.3 trillion in 1999; assuming international purchasing power parity, this was three
times the size of Japan’s output, 4.8 times the size of Germany’s and almost seven times
the size of the United Kingdom’s. Although the volume of its exports and imports exceeds
that of any other country, the value of the USA’s external sector, as a percentage of its GDP,
is comparatively low. Exports of goods and services accounted for less than 11 per cent of
GDP in 1999, considerably less than the European Union’s 25–29 per cent in recent years.
As noted earlier, our approach focuses largely on the period 1985–97, the period
when many observers feel the process of globalisation began to significantly affect the
world’s leading economies. The rationale here is to provide a framework for examining
a large sample of countries, so that their various unique patterns of globalisation could
be identified and examined as possible contributing factors to the differing manner in
which oil price shocks affect national economies.
With these goals in mind, the factor/discriminant analysis of US globalisation
found some significant differences between the US economy and the norm for group 1
countries. Table 3 reports the factor scores on the globalisation dimensions for the
USA, group 1 and group 2 countries. Factor scores are, in effect, an index formed from
the weighted average of the most important elements entering into a dimension. They
have a mean of zero, with positive numbers indicating an above-average attainment of
the country/group on that dimension. Negative scores are indicative of below-average
attainment of that dimension. On this basis:
(1) the US structural openness dimension scores considerably below the
group average, suggesting that trade plays less of a role in the US
economy than for other advanced industrial nations;
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Table 3
Dimensions of globalisation: factor scores, 1988–96
Structural General Financial Global
openness globalisation globalisation growth
1988 USA –1.305 1.367 0.023 0.773
Group 1 –0.190 1.166 –0.081 0.116
Group 2 0.112 –0.290 –0.080 0.690
1989 USA –1.109 1.238 –0.104 –0.078
Group 1 0.004 1.669 –0.119 –0.103
Group 2 –0.056 –0.292 –0.102 0.148
1990 USA –1.031 0.615 –1.114 0.143
Group 1 –0.024 1.387 –0.722 –0.109
Group 2 –0.027 –0.481 –0.600 0.037
1991 USA –1.116 1.185 –0.003 –0.108
Group 1 –0.066 1.423 –0.200 –0.208
Group 2 0.069 0.161 0.116 0.132
1992 USA –1.229 1.007 –0.041 0.280
Group 1 –0.142 1.504 –0.067 –0.269
Group 2 0.257 0.043 –0.182 0.306
1993 USA –1.159 0.876 0.054 0.247
Group 1 –0.180 1.399 0.407 –0.182
Group 2 0.381 0.102 –0.285 0.074
1994 USA –1.342 0.968 0.590 0.036
Group 1 –0.156 1.541 0.244 –0.223
Group 2 0.325 0.110 –0.071 0.146
1995 USA –1.278 1.134 0.074 0.214
Group 1 –0.294 1.618 –0.023 –0.208
Group 2 0.096 –0.117 –0.294 0.706
1996 USA –1.115 1.213 –0.160 0.217
Group 1 –0.326 1.724 –0.239 –0.106
Group 2 0.159 –0.034 –0.341 0.140
1997 USA –1.146 2.124 0.024 0.316
Group 1 –0.694 2.538 0.079 –0.159
Group 2 0.461 0.028 –0.558 0.100
Average USA –1.183 1.173 –0.066 0.204
Group 1 –0.207 1.597 –0.072 –0.145
Group 2 0.178 –0.077 –0.240 0.248
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(2) the general globalisation dimension is also somewhat below the group
norm; while
(3) financial globalisation and growth in the world market are above the
pattern typically found in other advanced countries.
Recent patterns of US globalisation have been (as in the other group 1 countries)
characterised by a rapid increase in the general globalisation dimension (figure 3).
Contrary to popular belief, the USA has not dramatically increased its relative posi-
tion to other countries, with regard to the other dimensions of globalisation: global
openness, financial flows or expansion in the global economy. This finding is consist-
ent with that of Dunn (2001). While Dunn’s main conclusion is that the US economy
is far from being completely globalised, our findings suggest that, at least with regard
to the general globalisation dimension, significant movement has been made in that
direction.










Global growth Financial flows Trade openness
General globalisation
Figure 3
Patterns of globalisation: USA
Factor scores: globalisation dimensions
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2.1.2 Globalisation and oil price shocks
The USA — a group 1 country — has, as we will see, the normal pattern of a
positive sign (table 4) associated with increased levels of general globalisation
i.e. over time, and everything else being equal, oil price shocks have been stronger
because of globalisation.  Perhaps as a result of the general globalisation dimension,
there has been a significant increase in the amount of GDP loss associated with oil
price shocks (figures 4 and 5).
2.2 Other countries
A similar analysis was undertaken for 18 additional countries, whose selection
was dictated largely by the available data. Here, the analysis found a clear linkage
between the globalisation defined country groups and the manner in which oil shocks
affect their economies (table 5). Over time, and contrary to popular opinion, group 1
countries have become more vulnerable to oil price shocks, in the sense that a ten per
cent increase in the price of oil today would cause a greater reduction in income i.e. the
oil shock driven loss in income as a per cent of GDP has increased gradually over time,
in line with the process of globalisation. For these countries, general globalisation and
Globalisation dimensions
General Structural Financial Global
globalization openness globalization growth
Cumulative
Impact year + ins ins ins
Impact year + 1 + ins ins ins
Impact year + 2 + ins ins ins
Cumulative per cent GDP
Impact year + ins ins ins
Impact year + 1 + ins ins ins
Impact year + 2 + ins ins ins
Yearly
Impact year + ins ins ins
Impact year + 1 + ins ins ins
Impact year + 2 + ins ins ins
Notes: Group 1 country.
US data used in the analysis.
+ indicates a factor increasing the strength of oil price increases in affecting GDP.
ins = statistically insignificant at the 95 per cent level.
Table 4
Summary oil shock impact analysis: USA
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Figure 4
Yearly oil shock impact: USA
10% oil shock % impact on US GDP
Figure 5
Cumulative oil shock impact: USA
10% oil shock % impact on US GDP
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Table 5
Summary oil shock impact analysis
Globalisation dimension impact
General Structural Financial Global
globalisation openness globalisation growth
Group 1 countries
USA +
Australia + + +
Austria + + –
Canada + +
Finland + + + –
France +
Germany + + +
Italy +
Netherlands + + ? +
Sweden + + – –
UK +
Japan + –
Spain + + – –
Group 2 countries
Korea – + + –
Philippines – – +
Portugal – –
South Africa – + +
Oil countries
Mexico (Group 2) – –
Norway (Group 1) – – + –
Notes: + indicates a factor increasing the strength of oil price increases in affecting GDP.
– indicates a factor weakening the strength of oil price increases in affecting GDP.
structural openness have been most responsible for the increased severity of oil shocks.
Changes in financial globalisation and the global growth dimension of globalisation
have not only played a much smaller role in this regard, but have also made some
countries less vulnerable and others more vulnerable — no clear patterns emerge from
these aspects of globalisation.
The two group 1 exceptions are Spain and Japan, where financial flows have
lessened somewhat the severity of oil price shocks. Nonetheless, oil price shocks still
inflict considerable economic losses on these countries.
As might be imagined, the two oil economies included in the study, Mexico and
Norway, would experience increased income associated with oil price shocks. On the
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Figure 6


































of oil price shocks
Not examined due
















September 2002 © 2002 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 257
other hand, movements in globalisation have resulted in Norway obtaining smaller and
smaller economic gains from oil price shocks, whereas Mexico’s have gains have
stabilised.
A very different globalisation/oil shock pattern characterises the group 2
(catching-up) countries. Over time, increases in the general globalisation dimension has
lessened the impact of oil price shocks on these countries. On the other hand, the financial
dimension has worked to increase the severity of oil shocks on most of these countries.
The net effect is that the Philippines, Portugal and South Africa have, with time, expe-
rienced a gradual increase in the severity of oil price shocks. In Korea’s case, the forces
of globalisation have appeared to neutralise each other. The net effect has been a rather
constant loss in income associated with oil price shocks.
Conclusions
Summing up (figure 6), these findings, combined with the likely trends in glo-
balisation, suggest that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, there is reason to believe
that oil price shocks in the future may produce more rather than less severe impacts on
the advanced industrial countries. Interestingly, these effects are less for the newly
industrialising or catching-up countries.
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